Forfeited Stock Options Journal Entries

Opções e a Implementação da Mordida de Imposto Diferido da Declaração FASB no. 123 (R) vai além de selecionar um método para avaliar opções de estoque de funcionários. Os CPAs também devem ajudar as empresas a fazer os ajustes contábeis tributários necessários para rastrear adequadamente os benefícios fiscais da remuneração baseada em ações. Declaração no. 123 (R) exige que as empresas utilizem a contabilização de impostos diferidos para opções de ações de empregados. Os atributos fiscais de opções determinam se uma diferença temporária dedutível surge quando a empresa reconhece a despesa de compensação relacionada à opção em suas demonstrações financeiras. As empresas tratam as opções não qualificadas e de incentivo de forma diferente. Empresas que não seguiram a abordagem de valor justo da Declaração nº. 123 deve estabelecer um pool de abertura de benefícios fiscais excedentes para todos os prêmios concedidos após 15 de dezembro de 1994, como se a empresa tivesse contabilizado as opções de compra de ações sob esta declaração. Para fazer isso, os CPAs devem fazer uma análise de subvenção por concessão dos efeitos tributários das opções outorgadas, modificadas, resolvidas, perdidas ou exercidas após a data efetiva da Declaração nº. 123. Certas situações incomuns podem exigir tratamento especial. Estes incluem casos em que os empregados perdem uma opção antes de serem adquiridos, a empresa cancela uma opção após a aquisição ou uma opção expira sem exercicio, geralmente porque está subaquática. Os CPAs também precisam ser cautelosos de possíveis armadilhas quando as opções estão subaquáticas, quando a empresa opera em outros países com diferentes leis tributárias ou tem uma perda operacional líquida. Cálculo do pool inicial do APIC e os cálculos fiscais em curso exigidos pela Declaração nº. 123 (R) é um processo complexo que exige uma manutenção cuidadosa dos registros. O método simplificado recentemente aprovado adiciona mais um conjunto de computações que as empresas precisam executar. Os CPAs devem encorajar as empresas a começar a fazer esses cálculos o mais rápido possível, pois alguns exigem o rastreamento de informações históricas. Nancy Nichols, CPA, PhD, é professora associada de contabilidade na James Madison University em Harrisonburg, Virginia. Seu endereço de e-mail é nicholnbjmu. edu. Luis Betancourt, CPA, PhD, é professor assistente de contabilidade na James Madison University. Seu endereço de e-mail é betanclxjmu. edu. Ouve a decisão de metodologia de avaliação necessária e ajudou a empresa a selecionar um método de adoção. Agora é hora de sentar e relaxar enquanto outras empresas se esforçam para terminar de implementar o FASB Statement no. 123 (revisado), pagamento baseado em compartilhamento. Mas espere. Antes de ficar muito confortável, existem outras preocupações que as empresas que emitem compensação baseada em ações devem lidar. Embora as questões de avaliação tenham recebido a participação dos leões na atenção, os CPA também devem ajudar as empresas imprudentes a lidar com a Declaração nº. 123 (R) s implicações fiscais. A mudança é inevitável Em antecipação à despesa obrigatória de opções de ações, 71 das empresas estavam revisando ou planejando revisar seus programas de incentivo para funcionários de longo prazo. Fonte: Hewitt Associates, Lincolnshire, Illinois. Hewitt. As regras fiscais contidas na Declaração nº. 123 (R) são complexos. Eles exigem rastrear os benefícios fiscais da compensação baseada em estoque em uma subvenção por concessão e país por país. Além disso, para reduzir o impacto da demonstração do resultado das transações futuras, as empresas precisam preparar um histórico de atividade de opção de estoque de 10 anos para determinar o valor do pool de capital adicional (APIC). Este artigo descreve o imposto e a contabilidade relevantes para que os CPAs possam ajudar os empregadores e os clientes a cumprir os novos requisitos com mais facilidade. O FASB DE FUNDAMENTO emitiu a Declaração no. 123 (R) em dezembro de 2004. De acordo com a Declaração anterior no. 123, as empresas tiveram a opção de contabilizar os pagamentos baseados em ações usando o método do valor intrínseco da APB Opinion no. 25, Contabilização de estoque emitido para empregados, ou método de valor justo. A maioria usou o método do valor intrínseco. Declaração no. 123 (R) eliminou essa escolha e exige que as empresas usem o método do valor justo. Para estimar o valor justo das opções dos empregados, as empresas devem usar um modelo de preço de opções, como Black-Scholes-Merton ou rede. Além de selecionar um modelo de precificação, as empresas precisam considerar o impacto contábil de impostos diferidos das opções de despesa com base no valor justo. Com o FASB Staff Position no. 123 (R) -3, permitindo que a maioria das empresas atinja, pelo menos, 11 de novembro de 2006, para determinar um método para calcular o pool de benefícios fiscais excedentes, ainda há tempo para CPAs ajudar as empresas a se prepararem para as questões fiscais diferidas. 123 (R) cria. CONTABILIDADE DE IMPOSTO DIFERIDO Declaração nº. 123 (R) exige que as empresas utilizem a contabilização de impostos diferidos para opções de ações de empregados. Os atributos fiscais de opções determinarão se uma diferença temporária dedutível surgirá quando uma empresa reconhecer a despesa de compensação relacionada a opção em suas demonstrações financeiras. Opções de estoque não qualificadas (NQSOs). Quando uma empresa concede a um funcionário um NQSO, ele reconhece a despesa de compensação relacionada e registra um benefício fiscal igual à despesa de remuneração multiplicada pela taxa de imposto de renda da empresa. Isso cria um ativo de imposto diferido porque a empresa está tomando uma demonstração de demonstração financeira que atualmente não é dedutível para fins de imposto de renda. Quando um funcionário exerce uma NQSO, a empresa compara a dedução fiscal permitida com a despesa de compensação contábil correspondente calculada anteriormente e credita o benefício fiscal associado a qualquer dedução fiscal excessiva à APIC. Em outras palavras, os CPAs devem comparar o benefício fiscal real com o ativo fiscal diferido e creditar qualquer excesso ao patrimônio líquido em vez da demonstração do resultado. Se a dedução fiscal for inferior à despesa de remuneração da demonstração financeira, a baixa do ativo fiscal diferido restante é cobrada contra o grupo APIC. Se o valor exceder o pool, o excesso é cobrado contra a renda. O activo por impostos diferidos da empresa geralmente difere do seu benefício fiscal realizado. Pense no ativo fiscal diferido como uma estimativa com base no custo de compensação registrado para fins de livros. As empresas não devem esperar que o ativo fiscal diferido seja igual ao benefício fiscal que eles finalmente recebem. O Anexo 1 ilustra a contabilização de NQSOs e impostos diferidos. Em 1º de janeiro de 2006, a XYZ Corp. concede opções de Jane Smith em 100 ações. As opções têm um preço de exercício de 10 (preço das ações na data da concessão), são adquiridas no final de três anos e têm um valor justo de 3. Todas as opções devem ser adquiridas. Assim, o custo de compensação a ser reconhecido ao longo do período de três anos é de 300 (100 opções X 3). Supondo uma taxa de imposto de 35, os mesmos lançamentos diários serão feitos todos os anos em 2006, 2007 e 2008 para registrar o custo de remuneração e o imposto diferido relacionado: Dr. Custo de Compensação Cr. Capital social adicional (Para reconhecer o custo de remuneração) Dr. Imposto diferido diferido (Para reconhecer um ativo fiscal diferido para a diferença temporária referente ao custo da remuneração) No final de 2008, o saldo no ativo fiscal diferido é de 105 e 300 adicionais pago em dinheiro. Suponha que Smith exerça suas opções em 2009, quando o preço das ações é de 30 por ação. Se as ações ordinárias da XYZs forem ações sem par, registraria o exercício da seguinte forma: A APIC POOL Declaração nº. 123 (R) fornece duas alternativas de transição: o método prospectivo modificado e o método retrospectivo modificado com atualização. Além disso, a posição do pessoal no. 123 (R) -3, que FASB postou em seu site em 11 de novembro de 2005, oferece uma terceira opção simplificada. Em todos os casos, os CPAs devem ajudar as empresas a calcular a quantidade de benefícios fiscais excedentes elegíveis (o pool APIC) na data de adoção. Isso é importante porque é ajudar a evitar uma declaração de renda adicional para ganhos para futuros exercicios de opções ou cancelamentos. Empresas que não seguiram a abordagem de valor justo da Declaração original nº. 123 deve estabelecer um pool de abertura de benefícios fiscais excedentes incluídos na APIC relacionados a todos os prêmios concedidos e liquidados em períodos que começam após 15 de dezembro de 1994, como se a empresa tivesse contabilizado as outorgas de ações nos termos da Demonstração nº. 123 abordam o tempo todo. Essas empresas também devem determinar quais seus ativos fiscais diferidos teriam sido se eles seguissem a Declaração nº. 123 provisões de reconhecimento. Se, após a adoção da Declaração nº. 123 (R), a despesa contábil de uma empresa em um exercício de opção é maior do que a dedução fiscal, a diferença, ajustada para impostos, é aplicada contra o pool APIC existente. Não tem impacto sobre as finanças do ano corrente. Sem o pool da APIC, a diferença ajustada por impostos seria uma despesa adicional do resultado. Obviamente, o cálculo do pool APIC inicial e do ativo fiscal diferido levará algum tempo. Os CPAs devem fazer uma análise de subvenção por concessão dos efeitos tributários de todas as opções outorgadas, modificadas, resolvidas, perdidas ou exercidas após a data efetiva da Declaração original nº. 123. (Essa declaração foi efetiva para os exercícios fiscais que começaram após 15 de dezembro de 1995. Para as entidades que continuaram a usar a abordagem do parecer n. ° 25, as divulgações pro forma precisavam incluir os efeitos de todos os prêmios concedidos nos exercícios fiscais iniciados após 15 de dezembro, 1994.) Para as empresas que utilizavam as disposições de reconhecimento do parecer no. 25, um bom ponto de partida será a informação usada anteriormente para a Declaração nº. 123 fins de divulgação. Os arquivos de preparação de devolução de impostos devem incluir informações sobre NQSOs exercidas e disposições ISO desqualificadas. Os arquivos do departamento de recursos humanos podem ser outra boa fonte de informação. Embora a manutenção dos registros deve ser feita de acordo com a subvenção, em última análise, os benefícios fiscais excedentes e as deficiências fiscais e de benefícios para cada bolsa são compensados ​​para determinar o grupo APIC. Prêmios concedidos antes da data efetiva da Declaração nº. 123 são excluídos da computação. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin no. 107 diz que uma empresa precisa calcular o pool APIC somente quando tiver um déficit no período atual. Dada a dificuldade de obter informações de 10 anos, as empresas devem iniciar esse cálculo o mais rápido possível, caso seja necessário. A APROXIMAÇÃO SIMPLIFICADA Uma posição recente do pessoal da FASB permite que as empresas elejem uma abordagem mais simples para calcular o saldo inicial do grupo APIC. Sob este método, o saldo inicial é igual à diferença entre Todos os aumentos no capital adicional integralizado reconhecido nas demonstrações financeiras da empresa relacionadas a benefícios tributários da remuneração baseada em ações durante os períodos após a adoção da Demonstração nº. 123, mas antes da adoção da Declaração no. 123 (R). A despesa de compensação incremental acumulada divulgada durante o mesmo período, multiplicada pela taxa de imposto legal consolidada atual da empresa quando adota a Declaração nº. 123 (R). A taxa de imposto combinada inclui impostos federais, estaduais, locais e estrangeiros. A compensação incremental cumulativa é a despesa calculada usando a Declaração nº. 123 menos a despesa usando o no. 25. A despesa deve incluir os custos de compensação associados aos prêmios que são parcialmente adquiridos na data da adoção. As empresas têm um ano após a data em que adotaram a Declaração nº. 123 (R) ou 10 de novembro de 2005, para selecionar um método para calcular o pool APIC. O IMPACTO DA SEGURANÇA DE CONCESSÃO POR GRAU As empresas determinam se o exercício de um NQSO por parte dos empregados cria um benefício fiscal excessivo ou uma deficiência em uma base de concessão por out, observando a despesa de remuneração e os ativos fiscais diferidos relacionados que registraram para cada bolsa específica Para ver o valor do ativo fiscal diferido liberado do balanço patrimonial. Os ativos fiscais diferidos relacionados a todos os prêmios não exercitados não são considerados. Se o empregado exercer apenas uma parte de um prêmio de opção, então somente o ativo fiscal diferido relacionado à parcela exercida é liberado do balanço patrimonial. STRADDLING A DATA DE EFICÁCIA Muitas empresas que utilizam o método de aplicação prospectiva modificada terão NQSOs que foram concedidas e, pelo menos, parcialmente adquiridas antes da adoção da Declaração nº. 123 (R). Quando os funcionários exercem essas opções, a empresa deve registrar a redução nos impostos correntes a pagar como crédito à APIC na medida em que exceda o ativo fiscal diferido, se houver. A Figura 3. abaixo, ilustra o impacto dos NQSO que se aproximam da data efetiva. SITUAÇÃO INUSESAIS CPAs que implementam os aspectos fiscais da Declaração no. 123 (R) podem encontrar algumas circunstâncias únicas. Confisco antes da aquisição. Os funcionários que deixam uma empresa freqüentemente perdem suas opções antes do termo de aquisição estar completo. Quando isso acontece, a empresa reverte a despesa de compensação, incluindo qualquer benefício fiscal que anteriormente reconheceu. Cancelamento após aquisição. Se um funcionário deixar a empresa após a compra das opções, mas não as exerce, a empresa cancela as opções. Quando os NQSOs são cancelados após a aquisição, a despesa de remuneração não é revertida, mas o ativo fiscal diferido é. A amortização é cobrada pela primeira vez para a APIC na medida em que há créditos acumulados no pool APIC do reconhecimento prévio de benefícios fiscais. Qualquer restante é gasto através da declaração de renda da empresa. Vencimento. Muitas opções não qualificadas expiram sem exercicio, geralmente porque as opções estão subaquáticas (o que significa que o preço da opção é maior do que o preço atual do mercado de ações). As mesmas regras se aplicam que com o cancelamento após a aquisição da despesa de compensação não é revertida, mas o ativo fiscal diferido é. A amortização é cobrada pela primeira vez para a APIC na medida em que há benefícios fiscais excessivos acumulados. Qualquer montante remanescente é gasto através da demonstração do resultado da empresa. POSSÍVEIS PITFALLS Ao implementar a Declaração no. 123 (R) CPAs precisam exercer algum cuidado em certas áreas. Taxas de impostos diferidos. As empresas que operam em mais de um país precisam ser especialmente cuidadosa no cálculo do ativo fiscal diferido. Esses cálculos devem ser realizados em cada país, levando em consideração as leis e taxas tributárias em cada jurisdição. As leis tributárias sobre deduções de opções de ações variam em todo o mundo. Alguns países não permitem deduções enquanto outros os permitem na data de concessão ou de vencimento. Opções subaquáticas. Quando uma opção está subaquática, Statement no. 123 (R) não permite que a empresa registre uma provisão de avaliação contra o ativo fiscal diferido. As licenças de avaliação são registradas somente quando a posição tributária geral de uma empresa mostra o lucro tributável futuro não será suficiente para realizar todos os benefícios de seus ativos fiscais diferidos. O ativo fiscal diferido relacionado a opções subaquáticas pode ser revertido somente quando as opções são canceladas, exercidas ou expiram sem exercicio. Perdas operacionais líquidas. Uma empresa pode receber uma dedução fiscal de um exercício de opção antes de efetivamente perceber o benefício tributário relacionado, pois possui uma perda de prejuízo operacional líquida. Quando isso ocorre, a empresa não reconhece o benefício fiscal e o crédito da APIC para a dedução adicional até que a dedução realmente reduza os impostos a pagar. IMPACTO DE FLUXO DE CAIXA O método que uma empresa seleciona para calcular o grupo APIC também tem um impacto sobre como representa benefícios fiscais realizados em sua demonstração de fluxo de caixa. Nos termos da Declaração nº. 123 (R) as empresas devem usar uma abordagem bruta para reportar benefícios fiscais excedentes na demonstração do fluxo de caixa. O benefício fiscal excedente das opções exercidas deve ser mostrado como uma entrada de caixa de atividades de financiamento e como uma saída de caixa adicional das operações. Os benefícios fiscais excedentes não podem ser compensados ​​contra deficiências de benefícios fiscais. O montante apresentado como entrada de caixa do financiamento será diferente do aumento da APIC devido ao excesso de benefícios fiscais quando a empresa também registrar deficiências fiscais e de benefícios contra a APIC durante o período. As empresas que elegerem a abordagem simplificada informam o valor total do benefício fiscal que é creditado na APIC a partir de opções que foram totalmente adquiridas antes de adotarem a Declaração nº. 123 (R) como entrada de caixa das atividades de financiamento e uma saída de caixa das operações. Para opções parcialmente adquiridas ou concedidas após a adoção da Declaração nº. 123 (R), a empresa reportará apenas os benefícios fiscais excedentes na demonstração do fluxo de caixa. Um bom ponto de partida para o cálculo do pool inicial da APIC e dos ativos de impostos diferidos é a informação que a empresa utilizou para a Declaração nº. 123 fins de divulgação. Os arquivos de preparação de devolução de impostos e os registros de recursos humanos também podem incluir informações sobre NQSOs exercidas e quaisquer disposições descalificadas ISO. As empresas precisam calcular o pool APIC somente quando tiverem um déficit no período atual. No entanto, dada a dificuldade de obter informações de 10 anos de idade, é uma boa idéia iniciar este cálculo o mais rápido possível, caso seja necessário. Se uma empresa atua em mais de um país, tenha cuidado ao calcular o ativo fiscal diferido. Execute os cálculos país por país, levando em consideração as leis e taxas tributárias em cada jurisdição. PENSAMENTOS FINAIS Muitas empresas ainda estão considerando modificações em seus planos de opções de ações existentes antes de adotar a Declaração nº. 123 (R). Aqueles com opções de estoque subaquáticas estão decidindo se deve acelerar a aquisição de direitos para evitar o reconhecimento da despesa compensatória. Embora a dedução da despesa de compensação possa ser evitada sob o método prospectivo modificado, o impacto no pool APIC não pode ser evitado. Quando as opções acabam por expirar sem exercicio, a empresa deve cancelar o ativo fiscal diferido de acordo com o pool da APIC na medida dos benefícios fiscais líquidos excedentes. Dependendo do tamanho da concessão da opção, isso pode reduzir o pool APIC para zero. Os requisitos contábeis de imposto de renda da Declaração nº. 123 (R) são muito complexos. Tanto o cálculo do pool inicial do APIC quanto os cálculos em andamento exigem que as empresas desenvolvam um processo para rastrear alocações de opções de ações individuais. O método mais recente simplificado apenas adiciona outro conjunto de computações que as empresas terão que executar. As empresas públicas também devem se concentrar na concepção dos controles internos adequados para atender aos requisitos da seção 404 da Lei Sarbanes-Oxley. Combinado com a dificuldade potencial de rastrear informações de 10 anos de idade, a conclusão óbvia é começar agora. Eliminação de Terras Públicas Américas A Terra Ferroviária concede O Movimento por Confiança Ganhos Vapor 75 anos de Fornecimento de Fornecimento de Terras Os Realizações e Falhas de Confirmação O legado de concessão de terra vive em referências citadas Eu agora desejo evitar um monopólio perpétuo de mais de 50,000,000 acres de terras por uma imensa empresa ferroviária. Espero que o Senado americano. Não é por sua ação, hoje, fazer com que sua posteridade amaldiçoe suas lembranças, criando assim um imenso monopólio em detrimento do país, à opressão e ferimento de todos os que se instalem nessa região. - O senador Howell dos EUA, argumentando contra subsídios adicionais à Ferrovia do Pacífico Norte, em 1870. As possibilidades de poder envolvidas em tal concentração da propriedade da terra, independentemente da madeira, dificilmente exigem discussão. O perigo de abuso desse poder, na ausência de regulação restritiva, é óbvio. Esse perigo, além disso, é grandemente aumentado porque alguns dos maiores proprietários desta terra também ocupam posições dominantes no transporte ferroviário em grandes regiões do país. - Escritório dos Estados Unidos, 1913-14. O historiador está menos interessado em saber se o governo fez uma pechincha afiada do que o destino dos 174 mil 000 hectares de terras federais e os aproximadamente 49,000,000 acres de terras do estado que foram oferecidas às ferrovias. - Historiador David Maldwyn Ellis, 1946 A lição das concessões de terra ferroviária depois de mais de cem anos é que o governo foi incapaz de lidar de forma afirmativa e firme com poderosos interesses econômicos. - Advogado Sheldon Greene, 1976. A disposição das terras públicas das Américas Logo após a Revolução, o governo americano começou a transferir grande parte do continente para a propriedade privada. Mais de um bilhão de hectares foram entregues ou vendidos a veteranos de guerra e outros indivíduos para o seu serviço ao país, concedidos aos estados para o desenvolvimento de seus sistemas de educação e transporte, para indivíduos para homesteading e para empresas que desenvolvam água, madeira e recursos minerais Para a nação. As leis passaram para transferir terras públicas para mãos privadas, incluindo o Ato de Terras de 1796, a Lei de Preempção de 1841, a Lei de Homenagem de 1862, a Lei Geral de Mineração de 1872, as Terras do Deserto e os Atos de madeira de pedra em 1870. As leis conseguiram rapidamente distribuir a maior parte das terras públicas, embora nem sempre, como veremos, ao público. No final da década de 1880, as leis da terra estavam sendo revisadas ou revogadas, porque o fim estava à vista para a disposição das terras públicas das Américas. Como o advogado e reformador da terra, Sheldon Greene, descreveu: durante os primeiros cem anos, o trabalho dos Estados Unidos era tomar posse de suas terras. A colonização e a expansão territorial dos Estados Unidos foram, simplesmente, uma queda colossal da terra. Essa transferência de riqueza não foi realizada sem especulações, ganância e fraude absoluta. Durante a maior parte das épocas de liquidação e preempção e propriedade, a corrupção nas relações de terra era a regra, e não a exceção. O chefe do Escritório Geral de Terra dos EUA, a agência que desembolsou terras federais, estimou que, em 1883, a fraude representava 40% das propriedades de 5 anos, 90% das reivindicações de madeira e 100% das reivindicações da Preemption e da comutação da Homestead. Uma pesquisa de 1910 estimou que 90 por cento da terra de preempção e herança em Wisconsin realmente havia sido adquirida para madeira. Na década de 1880, a taxa de entrada para os figurinistas variou de 50 para 125, você poderia comprar uma testemunha para 25. A ganância e os resíduos caracterizaram a época em que foi apelidado de Great Barbecue. A disposição do domínio público estava inextricavelmente ligada à Era Dourada, aos Barões dos Roubados, ao Oeste Selvagem e aos outros grandes mitos da era industrial americana e aos dramas e problemas que eles englobam. Muitos desses dramas ainda estão sendo jogados em todo o país hoje. O propósito deste trabalho é esboçar os sucessos e os fracassos do movimento para revivir os subsídios de terra da ferrovia e mostrar que, enquanto existirem os impérios não desejados das concessões de terra da ferrovia, as controvérsias políticas, socioeconômicas e ambientais Também continuará, assim como as opções para tomar medidas corretivas revendo as terras para o público. Tabela 1. Disposição de Terras Públicas Tipo de concessão ou venda As concessões de Terras Ferroviárias Uma das mais controversas alienações de terras públicas foi a concessão de terras de ferrovias, uma série de atos federais e estaduais entre 1850 e 1871. Os propósitos ostensivos da ferrovia As concessões de terras eram para construir sistemas ferroviários e telegráficos transcontinentais e para ajudar a estabelecer o Ocidente. As corporações ferroviárias, muitas vezes corporações públicas federadas, eram efetivamente agentes da política de terras públicas federais e estaduais. As estradas de ferro, em vez do Escritório Geral de Terra dos EUA, como costumava ser o caso, venderiam a terra aos colonos e usariam o dinheiro arrecadado para pagar a construção dos sistemas nacionais de transporte e comunicação. Além dessas provisões de venda pública, havia outras condições colocadas sobre os subsídios de terra, incluindo a construção de estradas de ferro dentro de um período específico, fornecendo serviço ferroviário em perpetuidade e transportando frete militar e postal a taxas reduzidas. A natureza, a magnitude e a implementação do programa de concessão de terras foram debatidas calorosamente por muitos anos. Os defensores das concessões de terra incluíram os argumentos de que a nação precisava de estradas militares para as guerras indianas e a Guerra Civil. O Oeste era uma região selvagem que precisava ser instalada e desenvolvida. As pessoas precisavam de terra, mas a terra ocidental era inútil sem abrir pelas estradas de ferro. As concessões de terra eram a única maneira de financiar a construção da ferrovia, e os EUA não perderiam dinheiro concedendo metade da sua terra e vendendo a outra metade pelo dobro do preço. Os opositores das concessões de terras argumentaram que as ferrovias não deveriam ser subsidiadas com recursos públicos e que o governo perderia receitas do seu programa público de vendas de terras. As concessões de terras eram muito superiores ao que era necessário para assegurar a construção das estradas de ferro e resultaria em monopólios corporativos de terras e recursos. Mesmo que o debate continuasse, as concessões de terra começaram a ser legisladas, com os oponentes conseguindo incluir o que se pensava ser salvaguardas contra a má administração ou o abuso. Tabela x. Estimativas de áreas de concessão de terras de ferrovias Antes de 1862, os subsídios foram feitos através dos governos estaduais, nove estados concederam quase 49 milhões de acres em concessões de terras de ferrovias. Em 1862, com o advento das estradas transcontinentais interestaduais, o governo federal começou a fazer as subvenções diretamente às corporações ferroviárias. A Tabela 2 mostra a maior das concessões de terras. Tabela 2. Subsídios de terra de ferrovia em mais de um milhão de hectares de área total de concessão de terras Os três quartos de todas as terras de concessão ferroviária foram eventualmente reunidos sob as quatro ferrovias: o Pacífico Norte (40 milhões de acres), Santa Fé (15 milhões de acres), Pacífico Sul (18 Milhões de acres) e Union Pacific (19 milhões de acres). Em 1995 e 1996, depois de mais de um século de aquisição e consolidação de dezenas de ferrovias menores, essas quatro ferrovias foram incorporadas em dois: Burlington Northern Santa Fe e Union Pacific (que adquiriram o Pacífico Sul). Os subsídios de trilhos ferroviários abrangiam dez por cento dos Estados Unidos continentais, ainda que devido aos padrões do corredor e xadrez das bolsas, sua influência se estende muito além disso. Um historiador estima que as corporações ferroviárias controlaram o assentamento de um terço do país e uma parcela ainda maior do oeste americano, onde a maioria das concessões de terras estavam localizadas. Ainda hoje, os maiores proprietários de terras em muitos estados ocidentais ainda são as ferrovias de concessão de terras e seus herdeiros corporativos. Grande parte da terra foi vendida para novas corporações, ou o legado das concessões de terras do século XIX é uma concentração notável e preocupante de propriedade da terra e exploração de recursos naturais que nunca foi planejada pelo Congresso. O controle das terras de concessão tem e continua a se traduzir em poder econômico e político para as empresas que os controlam. Tal como acontece com a maior parte da eliminação de terras públicas, as concessões de terras da ferrovia foram abundantes com a política e a fraude do barril de porco. As ações cometidas para evitar as provisões da concessão de terras, ou para defraudar o governo, o público e / ou os acionistas da ferrovia, incluíram: Suborno de funcionários federais e locais. Ameaças e violência contra funcionários, competidores, colonos e membros do júri. Contratar fatos engraçados para evadir as provisões de venda pública das concessões de terras. Armazenamento de estoque (vendendo mais ações do que a corporação vale) e outras formas de manipulação financeira e fraude. Processo de falência ilegal. Publicidade falsa nas vendas de terrenos. Desviando fundos de construção para empreendimentos imobiliários e não-ferroviários. Taxas tarifárias discriminatórias que discriminavam os agricultores e outros pequenos carregadores. A fixação de preços, as contraprestações ilegais e outros negócios de amor com corporações interligadas. Falha em investigar e patrocinar terras de concessão para evadir impostos sobre a propriedade. Realização de terras de concessão para especulação imobiliária e outros fins não ferroviários. Roubando madeira de terras públicas adjacentes. Pobre serviço ferroviário e abandono de linhas de filiais. As práticas monopolísticas do agronegócio: as ferrovias controlaram o transporte dos agricultores, os terminais de grãos, as hipotecas e outros empréstimos e, muitas vezes, inspecionaram livros de fazendeiros para monitorar seus lucros e fixaram suas taxas em qualquer tipo de tráfego. Controle das economias regionais e destruição das pequenas empresas. Desmatamento e perda de biodiversidade. Resíduos tóxicos das operações de mineração. Intercâmbios entre o governo corporativo e o governo das terras de concessão de tabuleiro para mais terras públicas. Alguns desses problemas surgiram nas décadas após a concessão e as ferrovias foram construídas. Outros continuam depois de mais de um século, enquanto alguns começam a ser ouvidos. Por uma variedade de razões, que vão desde falta de capital, terrenos acidentados, mau tempo, problemas de engenharia, problemas trabalhistas, falência repetida, má gestão, corrupção e fraude total, muitas das ferrovias não foram construídas conforme o planejado: de fato, quarenta de As ferrovias de concessão de setenta terras perderam os prazos de construção. Por exemplo, o Pacífico do Norte, tendo perdido seus prazos repetidamente, levou vinte anos (1864 a 1883) para construir e ainda estava fazendo reivindicações de terras de concessão em 1940. No final, após as falhas de construção, colapsos financeiros, ações judiciais e Atos de confisco e reavaliação, apenas três quartos da área de concessão de terras total oferecida foram efectivamente transferidos para as ferrovias. Um pouco mais de 131 milhões de hectares de terras federais e quase 49 milhões de hectares de terras do estado, foram transferidos para 61 estradas de ferro, incluindo 25% da terra em Washington e Minnesota, 20% de Wisconsin, Iowa, Kansas, Dakota do Norte e Montana, 14 por cento de Nebraska e 12 por cento da Califórnia. Entre 1867 e 1890, cerca de 35 milhões de hectares foram confiscados por 20 vias férreas de volta ao governo federal, por causa da falha das ferrovias em cumprir seus requisitos de concessão de terras. Em 1916, dois milhões de acres foram reapresentados da Oregon and California Railroad. Em 1929, a Ferrovia do Pacífico Norte perdeu a reivindicação de mais três milhões de acres. Em 1941, cerca de oito milhões de acres de reivindicações de terras adicionais foram divulgadas pelas ferrovias, que em troca foram liberados de seu contrato para dar taxas de transporte com desconto do governo. Na sabedoria convencional, a era da concessão de terras da ferrovia acabou. Mas ao traçar a história da confisco e examinar suas realizações e fracassos, veremos que o legado de concessão de terras está muito vivo. O Movimento por Confiança Ganhos Vapor A construção da legislação de concessão de terras revelou-se um desafio maior do que a construção das ferrovias. Dada a inépcia e a colusão do Escritório Geral de Terra dos EUA, do Congresso e dos tribunais, a ambivalência pública em relação às corporações, o desejo quase universal de propriedade privada, a confusão entre a natureza da propriedade privada e corporativa e as crenças generalizadas em manifestações Destino e a inesgotabilidade da fronteira e seus recursos, não é surpresa que a política de concessão de terras tenha sido perturbada desde o início. Houve debates sobre a propriedade e a magnitude dos subsídios federais às empresas para a construção de estradas públicas. Embora houvesse subsídios de terra para canais há décadas, a empresa ferroviária diminuiu os canais. Nem todos tiveram o mesmo entusiasmo pela construção de milhares de quilômetros de linhas ferroviárias através da região selvagem do Oeste. O debate sobre a necessidade das ferrovias foi misturado com debates sobre os direitos dos estados e a natureza do comércio interestadual. Intertwined with these questions were the regional disputes of the 1850s, which stalled Congresss selection of the general routes of the railroads. With the onset of the Civil War, the Southern delegation left Capitol Hill in the hands of Northern politicians. Not surprisingly, then, when Congress passed the 1862 Pacific Railway Act, the first transcontinental railroad was the Union Pacific rather than the Confederate Pacific. The Northern Pacific followed two years later. Once a majority of Congress was persuaded that transcontinental railroads should be subsidized by the federal government, there were additional problems in the design and implementation of the subsidy policy. The land grant legislation itself was ambiguous and contradictory. It was poorly administered by the Interior Department, the General Land Office, and U. S. Forest Service, which often colluded with the railroad corporations to transfer excess land. There was an unclear and shifting jurisdiction between the legislative, administrative, and judicial branches, and all three branches alternated between indecisiveness and collusion. The unfortunate checkerboard pattern of the land grants had begun during the canal land grant era, and continued with the railroad grants as a concession to opponents both of land subsidies and of interstate railroads. Land grant proponents compromised by agreeing to grant every other square-mile section of land to the railroads. The rationale for this was that the governments sections would double in value because of their proximity to the railroad, and thus the government would lose no revenues from its own land sales. The reality turned out quite differently for a number of reasons, including the fact that ultimately, not all the checkerboards were sold by the railroads or by the government, and the fact that the government did not always receive the expected 2.50 per acre. The pork barrel nature of many of the railroad projects, which seemed designed more to line private pockets than to build rail systems, became apparent early on. In some cases, land grants passed from corporate shell to corporate shell, without the roads ever being built. With a rising Populist movement threatening more than land grant forfeiture, a divided Congress finally began to recover some of the unearned land - even before ending the handouts. Arguments for forfeiture were based on the views that many of the railroads hadnt been built on time, or at all, or had abandoned unprofitable lines. The railroads were actually delaying settlement by withholding land they were supposed to sell to the public the railroads should not be rewarded for their speculative holding of lands. The railroads received more land than they needed to construct and maintain the railroads the excess should be returned to the public domain. Opponents of forfeiture tried to defend the railroads, saying that the railroads had earned their grants, and the U. S. was responsible for fulfilling its part of the contracts. Revesting grant lands would deprive railroad stock and bondholders of their value. Many stockholders were widows and orphans. Some of the railroads claimed that the unsold lands should not be forfeited because the land grant legislation did not actually require them to sell their land, but only to dispose of it. Union Pacific Railroad mortgaged its lands to an affiliated corporation, and claimed that while the lands had not been sold to settlers, they had been disposed of, and so were not subject to forfeiture. The Supreme Court agreed in that case, but rejected that argument in the Oregon amp California Railroad case. The Northern Pacific Railroad made a similar claim, that in its 1890s bankruptcy, it had sold the lands - even though they were all sold to one of its own subsidiaries, the Northern Pacific Railway . Northern Pacifics land transfers to itself were also approved by federal courts. Forfeiture was not the only method used to try to enforce the public sale requirement of the land grants. Two other methods were the homestead clause and administrative action by the General Land Office. After 1866, land grants included a homestead or actual settlers clause requiring the sale of grant lands to actual settlers only, in maximum parcels of 160 acres, at a maximum price of 2.50 per acre. This clause was routinely ignored by many of land grant corporations, as well as by the administrative agencies and Congress. One of the most disturbing aspects of the land grant story is the continued failure of Congress to draft unambiguous legislation, and the failure of the administrative and judicial bodies to enforce the law. Occasionally, as in the Oregon amp California case, violation of the settler clause did result in revestiture. But even in that case, the railroad was paid for the land (at the rate of 2.50 per acre, as specified in the land grant contract), and the illegal sales were allowed to stand. The public sale provision was reemphasized in 1870, when U. S. Representative William Holman of Indiana introduced a resolution declaring that the remaining public lands should be held for the exclusive purpose of securing homesteads to actual settlers under the homestead and preemption laws. The House endorsed the resolution, but proceeded to grant another 20 million acres to railroad corporations in the next year. Holman became the shepherd of forfeiture legislation for twenty years. He introduced legislation throughout the 1870s and 1880s, and in 1884 sponsored a stronger resolution calling for the forfeiture of all expired land grants. He was also a principal participant in the compromises which led to the General Forfeiture Act in 1890. 75 Years of Land Grant Forfeiture The forfeiture of land grants began even before they were all handed out, and continued for 75 years. Twenty-six railroads lost 40 million acres. There were many reasons for forfeiture, and most of the forfeitures were enacted as separate acts. For simplicity, historian David Ellis has divided the land grant forfeitures into three periods, to which we may add a fourth and fifth. Period 1: 1867-1877: The Early Period of Forfeiture The decade marked the end of the land grants and the beginning of forfeiture. Wholesale forfeiture was restrained by the wish to complete the railroad system, and by the fact that many grants did not expire until after 1877. Total forfeited: 650,000 acres. By 1872, the Republican Party followed the Liberal Republicans and the Democrats in adopting a platform against additional land grants. In 1873, the Credit Mobilier scandal broke. The Credit Mobilier, a construction subsidiary of the Union Pacific Railroad, had bribed its way to success by giving shares of stock to the U. S. vice-president, the vice-president-elect, Congressional committee chairmen, a dozen Republican House and Senate leaders, and the Democratic floor leader. Millions in capital were missing, reportedly funneled into the Credit Mobilier. All this became public knowledge: The members of it are in Congress they are trustees for the bondholders, they are directors, they are stockholders, they are contractors in Washington they vote these subsidies, in New York they receive them, upon the Plains they expend them, and in the Credit Mobilier they divide them. Under one name or another a ring of some seventy persons is struck. Congress investigated itself, and censured a few of its members. UP stock fluctuated, manipulated by railroad financier Jay Gould, and the UP debt to the U. S. went unpaid. The affair left the public aware of and disgusted by financial and political manipulation on a grand scale. In the beginning, forfeiture was seen as an administrative matter in which the General Land Office could restore to the public the grant lands of a railroad which had failed to meet its construction deadlines. In 1874, the Supreme Courts Schulenberg v. Harriman decision made forfeiture more difficult by ruling that it required Congressional action. If the grant be a public one, it must be asserted by judicial proceedings authorized by law. or there must be some legislative assertion of ownership of the property for breach of condition. In other words, even when a railroad failed to comply with the land grant conditions (as they often did), the title to the land remained with the railroad if the government did not take positive action. Even when lawsuits or legislative actions were underway, the lengthy nature of these actions meant that the railroads could proceed to construct track and patent land. Citizen oversight did not exist, and government oversight was often tardy or nonexistent. In 1877, the General Land Office urged Congress to either extend the construction deadlines or take action to forfeit the unearned grants. In that same year, a decade before the Northern Pacific forfeiture controversy reached its full height, Washington Territorial attorney general McGilvra urged the forfeiture of NPs Cascade branch. Period 2: 1877-1887: Major Period of Forfeiture During this decade, while 21 million acres of grant land was reopened to settlement, many railroads managed to avoid forfeiture by continuing construction. Total forfeited: 28,000,000 acres. Railroads Forfeiting Grant Lands Iron Mountain RR (MO, KS) Oregon Central RR (OR) Texas Pacific RR Atlantic amp Pacific RR (MO, AR, to Pacific Coast) Jackson (MS) to AL Elyton to Tennessee River (AL) Memphis and Charleston Railway (AL, SC) Savannah amp Albany RR (AL) New Orleans to MS State (LA) In 1878, Representatives Joyce and Thurman introduced forfeiture legislation in the House the Thurman bill forced the Union Pacific and Central Pacific to create sinking funds to ensure repayment of their debts to the government. Ever-creative, the railroads themselves used forfeiture as a strategy against their rivals. For example, Henry Villard, who controlled the Oregon Navigation and Railroad Company, pushed for the forfeiture of the Northern Pacifics grant, until he gained control of the NP in 1881. Subsequently another NP rival, the Central Pacific, pushed for the forfeiture of NPs grant in the 1882 Casserly bill. In the early 1880s, Knights of Labor and the Greenback National Party urged forfeiture, and by 1884, both major political party platforms included forfeiture, though the Republican platform included a loophole for any railroad except those where there has been no attempt in good faith to perform the condition of such grants. In 1883, the Knights of Labor urged forfeiture. In 1883, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary suggested that the courts, rather than Congress, were the proper arena for forfeitures, but on January 21, 1884, the House passed, in a 251 to 17 vote, a resolution introduced by forfeiture champion William Holman. The resolution urged the recovery of all unearned grants, and gave priority to forfeiture bills on the congressional calendar. More than half of the 70 railroads were not built on time. By 1885, up to a hundred million acres of grant lands lay along late or non-existing track. These became the focus of the proposals for a general forfeiture act. The U. S. General Land Office The U. S. Department of Interiors General Land Office (GLO), as the administering agency for public lands, was a key to the failures and the forfeitures of the land grants. Created in 1800 to administer the transfer of public lands into private hands, the GLO was variously described over the next 150 years as underfunded, inept, andor corrupt. It was at times all of those, and played a key role in the implementation of the homestead and land grant policies. The GLO Commissioners report for 1872 admitted that the agencys substandard salaries made the agency merely a sort of training school for land lawyers and agents for railways and private land companies. The GLO training school had a revolving door which very well served those corporations. For example, both of the principals of the premier land law firm of Britton amp Gray were former employees of the GLO, and their brothers-in-law were chief clerk and assistant chief of the GLOs railroad division. Britton amp Gray represented the Atlantic amp Pacific Railroad in its unsuccessful defense against the GLOs 1885 revocation of unselected indemnity lands, but were quite successful representing the Northern Pacific during the 1920s-30s hearings and lawsuit brought by the U. S. government. The nemesis to the General Land Offices routine failures and collusion was William Andrew Jackson Sparks, a self-made attorney, federal lands office receiver, Illinois state representative and senator, and from 1872 to 1882, a U. S. Representative, where he was an advocate of railroad regulation. In March 1885, Sparks was appointed GLO Commissioner by Grover Cleveland. Sparks found the state of affairs intransigent as well as unacceptable: I found that the magnificent estate of the nation in its public lands had been to a wide extent wasted under defective and improvident laws, and through a laxity of public administration astonishing in a business sense if not culpable in recklessness of official responsibility. That the abuses of the public lands laws are largely due to inefficient administration, to the conduct of weak or corrupt officials, and to erratic and fanciful decisions, is undeniable but that the laws themselves are defective in want of adequate safeguards is also true. The vast machinery of the land department appears to have been devoted to the chief result of conveying the title of the United States to public lands upon fraudulent entries under strained construction of imperfect laws and upon illegal claims under public and private grants. Within a month of being appointed GLO Commissioner, Sparks suspended the transfer of homestead entries in 10 states. He recommended the repeal of preemption acts and other public land laws that cash sales should be stopped, and that land should be made available to actual settlers only. Sparks also abolished land lawyers access to GLO clerks, thus making bribery and threats more difficult. Sparks estimated that ten million acres had been claimed in excess of the land grant formulas, and in 1885 and 1886, he administratively revoked 97,000 acres of NP grant land in Washington state, and 1.5 million acres of Atlantic amp Pacific Railroad grant in California, but he failed to recover another 90,000 acres from the AampP in Missouri. Sparks also went after lands fraudulently claimed by timber corporations. Depredations upon public timber are universal, flagrant, and limitless. Whole ranges of townships covered with pine timber, the forests at headwaters of streams, and timber land along water-courses and railroad lines have been cut over by lumber companies under pretense of title derived through preemption and homestead entries made by their employees and afterward assigned to the companies. Steam saw-mills are established promiscuously on public lands for the manufacture of lumber procured from the public domain by miscellaneous trespassers. Large operators employ hundreds, and in some cases thousands of men, cutting government timber and sawing it into lumber and shingles. Under cover of the privilege of obtaining timber and other material for the construction of right-of-way and land-grant railroads, large quantities of public timber have been cut and removed for export and sale. In his 1885 report, Sparks specifically mentions two corporations: the Sierra Lumber Company of California, and the Montana Improvement Company (MIC). In 1885, Sparks accused the MIC of cutting 45 million board feet from public lands, but the proceedings were dropped when the federal funds allocated to the case were exhausted. What followed was a convoluted series of transactions and corporate reorganizations-a pattern that has come to characterize the land grants evolution. The MIC, actually owned by principals of the Northern Pacific Railroad and Amalgamated Copper, went through a series of reorganizations. Amalgamated Copper itself, which purchased a million acres of NP grant land in Montana in 1907, was soon reorganized as Anaconda Copper. In 1993, the Northern Pacifics timber spin-off, Plum Creek Timber, bought back much of the Anaconda grant land (which had since been owned by ARCO and then by Champion International). Plum Creek Timber currently holds title to more than 1.5 million land grant acres in Montana, 90 percent of the timber industry land in the state. In 1885 and 1886, the two largest forfeitures were enacted by Congress: the Texas Pacific lost 15 million acres in New Mexico and Arizona, and the Atlantic amp Pacific lost 10 million acres along uncompleted roads in New Mexico and California. In March 1887, Congress directed the Department of Interior (DOI) to adjust all the railroad land grants, a process which until then had been up to the discretion of the DOI. If upon the GLOs calculation, it was found that railroads had too much land, they would be asked to relinquish it if they refused, the U. S. Attorney General was instructed to bring suit. In May 1887, the General Land Office (GLO) ordered railroads to show why their unselected indemnity lands should not be revoked, and in August 1887, the Interior Department restored 21,323,600 acres from the Northern Pacific, Southern Pacific, Oregon amp California, and other railroads to the public domain. But public lands reform had its limits. In 1886, Sparks had attempted but failed to cancel 1.5 million acres of the Northern Pacifics land grant in Washington State. Much of this land was soon purchased by the Weyerhaeuser timber syndicate. Sparks continued to push, but his limits were soon exceeded, in another case involving Weyerhaeuser. Sparks calculation that the Chicago, St. Paul (formerly St. Croix) Railroad had an excess of 406,684 acres was rejected by Interior Secretary Lucius Lamar, who ruled that the railroad had a right to indemnity for 200,000 acres. Sparks again clashed with Lamar in 1887, ending hopes of a threatened suit against Weyerhauser over title to North Wisconsin Railroad indemnity lands. Having pushed as far as Clevelands administration and the corporations would allow, the tension led to Sparks forced resignation in November 1887. Sparks departure, instigated by the future Secretary of the Interior William Vilas of Wisconsin, was covered by newspapers, which included descriptions of Vilas timber interests. Sparks is famous for being impetuous, for having an excitable disposition, and for his crusading fervor. Sparks blunt style can be found in the Congressional Record . and in his annual reports, which are full of stories about the bold, defiant, and persistent depredators on the public domain. His sympathies were clear: The rights of the corporations have been upheld. The defaults of the companies have been voluntary. The rights of the public are now to be considered - the right of the people to repossess themselves of their own. The case is not one calling for sympathy to the corporations it is one calling for justice to the people of the country. One historian has observed, During his three years in office Commissioner Sparks established a record practically unique in Land Office history. He attempted with considerable vigor to improve the methods, practices, and conditions of the Office. At times he blundered, but there is no question of his honesty. He worked with hope that he could secure Congressional assistance, but Congress only confronted him with additional handicaps. One wonders, given the legal and political atmosphere during the wholesale disposal of the public lands, and given the state of the General Land Office, if an effective reformer might not have blundered. Sparks honesty and willingness to act boldly were what the GLO most needed. Yet more than a century later, Sparks is still viewed from some quarters with condescension and ill feeling. During Sparks short tenure, Congress revested more than 28 million acres of railroad land grants, most of it from the Texas Pacific and Atlantic amp Pacific Railroads in New Mexico, Arizona and California. In August and December 1887, Interior Secretary Lamar had revoked 21 million acres in railroad land withdrawals and restored the lands to public entry. During President Clevelands administration, more than 81 million acres were (at least temporarily) restored to the public domain, land that had been seized, as Sparks put it, by illegal usurpation, improvident grants, and fraudulent claims and entries. But in the end, the value of the lands and resources made the transfer process impossible to control. Sparks removal from office in 1887 was followed by a backslide into frenzied patenting of public lands by corporations, guided by the cronyism of Interior and GLO executives, and covered up by the convenient disappearance of General Land Office records. The new GLO Commissioner explained in his annual report that he tried to make up for the delays Sparks had caused in transferring public lands to private ownership, claiming that the GLOs work had to be resumed so hastily that many of the records had disappeared because of bad ink. Interior Secretary William Vilas approved the speed-up in the work of the GLO, once issuing 3,633 patents in one week. His successor, John Noble, an attorney serving railroad, mining, and other large corporations in the Southwest, went even farther in speeding the patenting process, especially for timber cases, proving himself a true friend of the corporations dummy entrymen. GLO Commissioner Lewis Groff attacked Sparks reforms and did his best to downplay the fraud. By the height of the movement to revest railroad land grants, Congressmen were announcing that The great corporations and other monopolies have for many years been stretching out their strong and unscrupulous arms over the public lands remaining for enterprising and honest settlers. Millions of acres of this domain have been seized and stolen, and I have to say this robbery could not have succeeded without the collusion and cooperation of agents employed to protect the interests of the people. Immense combinations have been formed, including the ties of political and social life, for a common object-to break down all attempts at Washington to crush out a venal system which has flourished by departmental indifference or favor. But Congress steadfastly refused to improve the GLO, and the courts refused to enforce the laws. Open fraud by prominent figures, ignored by Congress and upheld by the courts, was accompanied by continued bribery and violence against government officials and witnesses. The Great Barbecue continued until there was little left. What was left, the Forest Reserves, had to be set aside by administrative order. The GLO was absorbed into the U. S. Bureau of Land Management in 1946, which continues to pass public land and timber to corporations. Congressional Committees and the Regulation of Railroads Several Congressional committees investigated the construction of railroads and the implementation of the land grant policy. The Credit Mobilier scandal of the mid-1870s has already been mentioned. In another investigation in 1887 and 1888, the U. S. Pacific Railway Commission investigated the Central Pacific and Southern Pacific Railroads, finding corruption, unpaid debts, missing funds, and missing receipts and other records. Other investigations, concerned with the ongoing operation of the railroads, led to the creation of the first regulatory agency: the Interstate Commerce Commission. In 1885 and 1886, the Senates Cullom Committee investigated various railroad abuses, including excessive and discriminatory rates, secret rebates, and manipulation of railroad company stock. The committees work led to the creation in 1887 of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) for the regulation of railroad operations. However, the ICC was stacked with railroad men, and with their usual creativity and ruthlessness, the railroads managed to use the ICC to their advantage. In an 1892 letter to his friend Charles E. Perkins, president of the Chicago, Burlington amp Quincy Railroad, U. S. Attorney General Richard Olney wrote: The Commission, as its functions have now been limited by the courts, is, or can be made of great use to the railroads. It satisfies the popular clamor for a government supervision of railroads, at the same time that supervision is almost entirely nominal. Further, the older such a commission gets to be, the more inclined it will be found to take the business and railroad view of things. It thus becomes a sort of barrier between railroad corporations and the people and a sort of protection against hasty and crude legislation hostile to railroad interests. The part of wisdom is not to destroy the Commission but to utilize it. Period 3: 1887-1894: The Push for a General Forfeiture Act The organized push for general forfeiture legislation was softened by land grant defenders in the Senate, who succeeded in limiting the forfeitures to lands adjoining uncompleted portions of the railroads. From 1888, the real focus of Congress was on passage of a general forfeiture act which would deal with the almost 100 million acres of grant lands alongside railroads which had not been built on time. Various versions of general forfeiture legislation were pushed and compromised by land reformers, rival railroads, their stock and bondholders, and by their lobbyists and representatives in Congress. A triangle of interests sought various degrees of forfeiture of unearned land grants. Three members of the House Committee on Public Lands agreed with the Senates stance that 5,600,000 acres of lands adjoining uncompleted railroads should be forfeited. The majority on the Committee sought forfeiture of 54,000,000 acres of lands adjoining any portions of railroads not completed within their time limits. Two members sought the forfeiture of all 78,500,000 acres of the grant lands of railroads which had not been completed on time. Having sought revestment of grant lands for 20 years, U. S. Representative William Holman now argued against radical proposals which would doom the legislation, warning that endless litigation would result. The middle ground was approved by the House in a vote of 179 to 8, but it was rejected by the Senate. Holman neednt have feared a radical law that couldnt be enforced. The General Forfeiture Act which did pass in 1890 was the conservative Senates version of less than six million acres, which Holman charged was sponsored by the Northern Pacific Railroad itself in order to avoid a larger forfeiture. In fact, the Northern Pacific, having acquired the existing Oregon Railroad line along the Columbia River, did not intend to build another, and had given up any claims to the adjoining land. The General Forfeiture Act reclaimed only 5.6 million acres from eleven railroads, including the Northern Pacific (2,000,000 acres), the Southern Pacific (1,075,200 acres), the Gulf amp Ship Island (652,800 acres), and the Mobile and Girard (536,064 acres). The fight in Congress was not yet over. In 1892, with the Populist Party calling for the return of all land held by railroads and corporations in excess of their actual needs, and all lands now owned by aliens, the House passed a bill which called for the recovery of all lands not earned within the time limits. The bills would have revested more than 50 million acres, but the Senate failed to act. The House passed a similar bill in 1894, even protecting innocent land purchasers by including an exemption for purchasers of less than 320 acres. The Senate again opposed the bill, with forfeiture opponent Dolph warning that vast interests, large farms, vast tracts of lands, the interests of the purchasers of the railroad companies. would be destroyed by further forfeitures. Of course, that was the point of forfeiture--to dismantle unintended empires. But Dolph represented powerful interests, and prevailed. Forfeiture historian Ellis marks 1894 as the end of the forfeiture movement, observing that the later forfeiture cases of the Oregon amp California and Northern Pacific Railroad grew out of special circumstances, and were different from the 1867-1890 forfeitures, which were based mainly upon the construction and time limit failures of the railroads. Period 4: 1908-1917: Oregon amp California Revestment The General Forfeiture Act of 1890 had marked the climax of forfeiture as a strategy to deal with the failures of the land grant policy. Later forfeitures, while large, concerned but two railroads whose failures were especially glaring: the Oregon amp California Railroad (by then a subsidiary of the Southern Pacific) and the Northern Pacific Railroad. The Oregon amp California forfeiture was preceded by the Oregon land fraud trials of 1903 to 1910. More than a thousand people were indicted, and more than 100 were convicted for defrauding the U. S. and Oregon state governments of land by forgery, perjury, falsification of records, bribery and intimidation of witnesses and officers of the courts, and obstructing free passages over public lands. Those indicted included the U. S. District Attorney, a General Land Office Commissioner and some of his agents, U. S. government surveyors, both U. S. Senators and a U. S. Representative from Oregon (including U. S. Senator Mitchell, who had been one of the staunch opponents of land grant forfeiture). Also indicted were Oregon State Senators, Assistant Attorneys for Oregon, city and county officials, and bankers, attorneys, lumber dealers, hotel owners, real estate agents, and stockbrokers. Wile convictions were relatively few, they were scandalously noteworthy, and resulted in the break-up of several land fraud rings, and in the repeal of the easily-abused lieu-land provisions of the Forest Reservation Act. The Oregon land fraud trials set the stage for a much larger case: that of the Oregon amp California Railroad. By 1908, the OampC, out of its grant of 3.7 million acres, had sold only 813,000 acres, and only 127,000 acres of that had been sold in parcels no greater than 160 acres, to actual settlers only, for no more than 2.50 per acre. The OampC had sold the other 700,000 acres, much of it to timber corporations, in violation of the law, in parcels of thousands or tens of thousands of acres, at prices up to 10 per acre. And in 1903, the OampC (by then a subsidiary of Harrimans Southern Pacific) announced that it would sell no more land at all. Investigators sent by President Roosevelt ended up on railroad and timber payrolls. Roosevelt eventually turned to Gifford Pinchot, who sent U. S. attorney Francis Heney, who successfully prosecuted some of the principals. After a series of Congressional acts and court decisions between 1908 and 1918, the Oregon amp California Railroad forfeited 2,900,000 acres. The revested acreage was transferred to the GLOs successor agency, the U. S. Bureau of Land Management (BLM), which sold most of the timber to corporations over the next fifty years. The OampC revestment set several important precedents. One was that railroads were not entitled to be rewarded for their speculation: with the backing of the U. S. Supreme Court, the railroad was paid only the 2.50 per acre it was supposed to have received. Another part of the revestiture proved quite agreeable to the purchasers of the railroads lands. In 1912, Congress passed the Forgiveness (or Innocent Purchasers) Act, which allowed purchasers of OampC parcels of more than 1,000 acres to keep the lands if they paid the U. S. government the 2.50 per acre originally required. Smaller purchasers werent required to pay at all. Period 5: 1924-1940: The Battle for the Northern Pacific The Northern Pacific Railroad received the largest of all land grants. Running across the northern tier from the Great Lakes to Puget Sound, the NP eventually claimed almost 40 million acres. In the size of its land grant, but also in its violations, controversies, investigations, and lawsuits, the Northern Pacific had no peers. In 1886, General Land Office Commissioner Sparks restored to the public domain 1.5 million acres of Northern Pacific grant land grant in western Washington, declaring that the 1870 amendments to the original 1864 NP legislation did not clearly and unequivocally grant additional land. Although House and Senate reports in 1884 recommended forfeiture of the NPs grant along the Columbia River, and there was a proposal in Congress to forfeit the Northern Pacific Railroads Cascade line, Sparks order was reversed by Interior Secretary Lamar in 1887. In 1888, a H. R. 9151, which would have forfeited three-quarters of the NP land grant, was passed without debate, but the Senate refused to act upon it. The Western Washington land remained under the control of the NP, and soon became the basis for Weyerhaeusers vast timber holdings in the Northwest. Instead, the 1890 General Forfeiture Act reclaimed only the two million acres of unearned NP land along the Columbia River, leaving most of the grant lands in control of the railroad. In the next two decades, the NP sold millions of acres to timber and mining corporations, including Weyerhaeuser, Boise Cascade, Potlatch, and Amalgamated Copper (later named Anaconda Copper). In 1905, the Northern Pacific had filed a claim for 5,600 acres within the Gallatin National Forest. In 1915, the GLO, having realized its error in issuing the patents, filed suit against the NP, but the U. S. Supreme Court ruled in 1921 that the government could not deny land claims that fell within forest reserves. The U. S. attorneys who worked on that case were soon brought in for a much larger job: investigating the entire 40-million-acre Northern Pacific land grant. Joint Congressional hearings were held from 1924 to 1928, detailing dozens of violations by the Northern Pacific Railroad, ranging from failure to sell the grant lands at public auction, diverting construction funds to non-rail purposes such as timber, mining, and real estate speculation, failure to sell stock to the public as required, tax evasion, and fraudulent classification of land. In 1929, Congress acted upon the Joint Committees recommendations by revoking NPs claims to another 2,900,000 acres lying within National Forests in Montana, Washington, Idaho, and Oregon, and directing the U. S. Attorney General to file suit against the railroad in order to have a complete judicial accounting and determination of any and all issues arising out of violations of the Northern Pacific land grant. Twenty-two charges were brought by the U. S. against the railroad. A complex ten-year case followed, with rulings by special masters, federal district courts, and the U. S. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court left several major charges undecided, and the entire case was ended with a settlement between the railroad and the Attorney General. Northern Pacific agreed to pay the U. S. 300,000 and lost its claims to 2.9 million acres, but retained 39 million acres of land. 1941: The Railroads Release Further Claims Between 1867 and 1940, more than forty million acres of railroad grant land had been forfeited. On the eve of World War II, the railroads and the federal government had another concern: the requirement that the land grant railroads haul military freight at reduced rates. The U. S. Board of Investigation and Research, created by the Transportation Act of 1940, concluded that the ending of land grant rail rate concessions should be a two-way street, with the railroads returning their remaining lands to the government. So in 1941, with their eye on wartime profits, the land grant railroads released further claims on eight million acres, in exchange for being released from reduced rates for government freight. More than half of the acreage released was by the Northern Pacific, which surrendered 4,500,000 acres of additional claims. The Boards investigation provided the following list: Table 3. Patented Railroad Grant Lands in 1941 Atlantic Coast Line The Accomplishments and Failures of Forfeiture Law professor John Leshy has summarized the problems in the land grant policy, and of the attempts of Congress and the courts to address those problems. His conclusions are quoted at length because he is currently the Solicitor of the U. S. Department of Interior. Litigation has been. ineffective, even though the courts continued to acknowledge that the intent of Congress has been thwarted. In one celebrated instance arising shortly after the turn of the century, the United States sought to enforce a proviso of the OampC railroad grant, charging that the railroad grantee had retained most of the granted land and sold the rest of it in violation of the statutory size and price limits. After the Supreme Court agreed, Congress enacted legislation which revested title to the unsold lands in the United States but which, significantly, ignored those lands the railroad had previously sold to third parties in quantities or at prices exceeding the terms of the grants. Moreover, in taking back title to the unsold lands, the United States paid the railroad grantee the price the latter would have received if it had complied with the restriction by selling to settlers. Thus, even in this exceptional situation, which gave birth to the so-called OampC lands in western Oregon, purchasers from the railroad were fully protected despite their lack of bona fides . and the railroad suffered no actual penalty from its breach. Apart from this almost unique case, the restrictions in the railroad grants turned out to be largely unenforceable and ineffective. A basic problem was in the language of the grants: for example, the restrictions were not clearly labeled as covenants or conditions (a legally significant distinction), failed to set out a clear mechanism for transferring the land to settlers, and were silent both on remedies for violation and on their enforceability by the courts at the initiative of either the executive branch or potential settlers. These ambiguities eventually resulted in a series of Supreme Court decisions--such as the one allowing railroads to shield themselves from the duty to sell the lands simply by mortgaging them--which largely negated the restrictions. After years of wrangling, Congress and the executive branch together finally washed their hands of the matter on the eve of World War II. This is not to say that congressional attempts to include these restrictions were totally frustrated indeed, some of the land subject to the restrictions passed from railroad ownership, and small parcels actually were sold cheaply to those bona fide settlers Congress apparently intended to benefit. But even today railroads own large acreages that had been subject to these restrictions, and undeniably disposed of some of their grant lands in large tracts, at higher than statutory process, to other than actual settlers, all in contradiction of the ostensible purpose of Congress. The fact that some of the granted lands actually ended up in the hands of the intended secondary beneficiaries seems more coincidental than not. Was the public interest served by subsidizing the transcontinental railroads with public land grants Historians have argued convincingly that not only would the land grant railroads have been built without subsidies, but that the land grant railroads actually delayed settlement of the West. In the nineteenth century, the opening and settling of the West was widely assumed to be a public good bordering on absolute necessity. But it clearly benefited some more than others, and the wisdom of the land grant policy was ferociously debated even at the time. Another issue is the size of the land grants. Author Lloyd Mercer, who spent years analyzing the land grant subsidies, did his best to show that they were a profitable deal for the public, but he didnt factor in the billion of dollars worth of real estate, timber, coal, oil, gold, and other resources in his calculations. He also stopped his calculations at the year 1900, using turn of the century land values and rates of return. Even so, he concluded that the Northern Pacific grant was particularly excessive. The public (i. e. the settlers) should hardly have been secondary beneficiaries, as Leshy describes them. Yet the public has participated in its own defrauding. It is time for the public, through its representatives in Congress, to right the wrongs of a century. The Northern Pacific Empire Builder James Hill dismissed the controversies, claiming that When we are all dead and gone the sun will still shine, the rain will fall, and this railroad will run as usual. He may have been right about that. But as usual turns out to mean that the sun shines on deforested hillsides, and the rain falls in torrents and landslides, and trains are frequently derailed because of inadequate safety and manpower. The country can do better with its public lands and with its rail system. Perhaps a more realistic estimate has come from public lands scholars George Coggins and Charles Wilkinson: It is not necessary to chronicle fully the splendid indifference to the common public good in the matter of transcontinental railroads. When the Great Barbecue was over, Congress had given over 90 million acres to the railroads directly and another 35-40 million acres to states to be used by the railroads (in addition to another 200 million acres for other internal improvements, some of which were also granted to railroads). The progress of the first transcontinental line the Union Pacific and Central Pacific is somewhat typical of the problems generated. The Gilded Age was one of the low points of public morality in the United States, but its effects were not uniformly bad. As promoters, the railroads encouraged and directed immigration. The West was developed, and towns sprang up in the railroads wake. Opposition to the worst abuses was noteworthy and led to some worthwhile reforms. The railroad enterprise effectively ended the frontier. Pressure to force return of the railroad lands to the public domain has continued all through this century and has not yet died out completely. Nor will it, as long as the lands are controlled by corporations to the detriment of local communities, the public, and the land itself. As historian Fred Shannon wrote in 1946, If any lobbying is justifiable today it should be from a peoples lobby. It should demand that after three-quarters of a century (in some cases almost a century) of private profit from public gifts, it is now time for the people to take back the property without further recompense, so that in the future the benefits shall be reaped by the people who paid. Any reimbursement to the people made by the land-grant railroads such as reduced rates for government freight, to the present, has been just a little interest on the original obligation. The Land Grant Legacy Lives On The railroads and their defenders continue to claim that the land grant era ended in 1941. For example, railroad lobbyist Frank Wilner has argued that both Congress and the federal courts have ruled that the books have been closed on the matter of past railroad land grants. Many legal scholars disagree, and the U. S. Supreme Court itself, in the OampC revestment case, declared that the land grant laws are covenants, and enforceable. The grants must be taken as they were given. Assent to them was required and made. The acts are laws as well as grants and must be given the exactness of laws. This comment applies to and answers all the other contentions of the railroad company based on waiver, acquiescence and estoppel and even to the defenses of laches and the statute of limitations. Regardless of the pronouncements of railroad men, lobbyists, and judges, the land grant legacy clearly lives on, as can be seen by examining todays socioeconomic and environmental controversies in newspaper headlines, Congressional hearings, citizens petitions for return of the grant lands, land exchanges involving land grant checkerboards, and other efforts to address the continuing problems deriving from the land grant legacy. The days of robber barons, open fraud, and railroad wars are not over. The heirs to the land grant empires continue their control of the land, and their political influence. Timber and mining corporations which acquired railroad grant lands use their wealth to defeat state referendums for forest protection, to forward their own legislative proposals which give them access to additional public lands and exempt them from environmental laws, to squeeze independent companies out of business, and to price-gouge consumers, and to export forests and jobs. Citizen Pressure, Agency Hearings and Investigations As in the nineteenth century, the public pushes regulators, Congress, and the courts to understand and resist the political power of the land grant corporations. In 1972, the National Coalition for Land Reform (NCLR) filed a Petition for Return of Railroad Lands as an administrative complaint to the Secretary of the Interior. The petition asked the Secretary to investigate the status of the land grant-based corporations and their noncompliance with the law, an investigation which the petitioners were convinced should result in forfeiture or sale of the remaining grant lands, and reimbursement to the public treasury of profits derived from illegal exploitation of the grant lands. The Secretarys rejection of the petition was filed on August 31, 1972, on behalf of the Southern Pacific Transportation and Southern Pacific Land Company. A few years later, the non-profit Center for Balanced Transportation (CBT) urged Congress to conduct oversight hearings into the Interior Departments handling of the NCLRs land grant petition. The CBT, whose work encompassed national and state transportation and energy issues, had conducted historical and legal analyses of the Northern Pacific land grant, concluding that the policy had failed, but that Congress could still address the problems. In the early 1980s, the National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, backed by the National Grange, the National Farmers Organization, the American Farm Bureau, and the National Wheat Growers Association, called for congressional investigation into the obligation of the land grant railroads to use their land grant income to sustain and strengthen rail operations and the extent to which the carriers have breached their contracts with the government by transferring land grant assets out of the railroad without adequate compensation. Unhitching the Grants, Exploiting the Land In the 1970s and 1980s, as a result of a complex web of events, including the depletion of public lands resources, declining railroad profits, and railroad deregulation, many of the land grant railroads spun-off their land grant resources into new, independent corporations. The railroad mergers and restructuring inspired protest from rival transportation systems, railroad employees, citizens, and a new wave of hearings and studies by state and federal governments. The U. S. Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) conducted several studies on railroad mergers and holding companies. Its 1977 study on Railroad Conglomerates and Other Corporate Structures showed that land, natural resources, and other valuable assets (assets acquired over the years by government grant) had been diverted from the railroads transportation purposes and had diminished railroad revenues. The railroad as an instrument of public service has been deprived of wealth accumulated over many years, including resources such as land grants provided at public expense. The ICC concluded that the interests of conglomerate managements and their stockholders often diverge from the public interest in a sound transportation system, and that the continuation of asset separation poses a potential threat to the future health of the Nations rail system. In 1982, U. S. Representative Byron Dorgan (D-SD) initiated a Congressional investigation of railroads by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. Dorgan claimed that the Interstate Commerce Commission has adopted such a narrow view of its authority regarding rail holding companies and land grants. that it is doing virtually nothing to protect the public in these areas. This is why the ball is in the Congress court. It does not seem fair to expect our taxpayers to provide additional subsidies, and our shippers and merchants to pay exorbitant freight rates, while rail managements turn to other uses the subsidies they have already received. Nor does it seem fair to permit these managements to use the holding companies device to walk away from the bargain with the American people regarding the railroad land grants. Joint Congressional Committee hearings requested by Dorgan and Representative Pat Williams (D-MT) were followed by a bill introduced by Williams that would require all land grant railroads (or their holding companies) to put a third of their pre-tax profits from resource extraction into railroad maintenance. Williams declared that Congress must decide whether the public still has a right to demand service from the railroads as a result of the enormous grants of land they received in the 1880s. In 1980, U. S. Rep. John Dingell (D-MI), chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, requested that the Interstate Commerce Commission condition approval of the proposed merger of the Union Pacific, Missouri Pacific, and Western Pacific Railroads upon a study of the value of their land grants and mineral rights. Dingell wrote that it is unacceptable to have government aid diverted from its main objective of benefiting the ultimate public which the railroads serve. The next year, U. S. Representative Sieberling (D-OH), also concerned about the transfer of land grant assets to non-rail corporations, requested that the ICC continue its investigations of the effects of railroad holding companies which then spun off land grant assets to separate corporations. Calls for the investigation of railroad holding companies and land grant spin-offs also came from railroad employees and rival transportation systems. For example, the Water Transport Association claimed that the revenues and profits from land grant resources should be included when determining how much railroads should be allowed to charge for service. Additional challengers to Burlington Northern Railroads move to create a holding company for land grant assets included the Western Coal Traffic League, the State of Minnesota, BN employees, and a citizens group. In 1982 hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee, the Railway Labor Executives Association expressed concern over the reduction of railroad plant and rail labor jobs due to the stripping of assets. The Western Coal Traffic League (utilities and industries) supported legislative initiatives to prevent the milking of the Burlington Northern Railroad of its resource assets, including its land grant assets. Congressman Pat Williams of Montana claimed that the land grant assets should come into play. BN ought to call upon some of its remaining land grant properties as a source of revenue with which to upgrade railroad lines in Montana. Continuation of service on the lines may or may not be profitable, but will be a public service, and public service was the intent of the land grants. Not surprisingly, Richard Bressler, the CEO of Burlington Northern, testified that his corporation did not recognize any continuing obligations, but hearings chairman Senator Max Baucus said I believe the federal government should determine once and for all whether the land grants created a continuing obligation for rail carriers to provide rail service. The conclusions of these hearings were backed by Congressional Research Service studies which reiterated the continuing obligations of the railroads, and the duty of Congress to determine just what those obligations were. Land Buy-Outs: Buying Back Public Land Though the grant lands were supposed to be sold to settlers, generally at 2.50 per acre, much of the land was held by the railroads or sold in large parcels to other corporations. Under the rationale that the public needs green space, some of the corporations are now selling the grant lands back to the public--at hundreds or thousands of dollars per acre. Table 4. Land Grant Sales to Public Agencies Every year, there are dozens of land exchanges around the country. Originally used as a way to deal with small private inholdings within public lands, in recent years the exchanges have become much larger, often encompassing tens of thousands of acres. Many of the land exchanges now being arranged involve the land grant checkerboards. Exchanges are a politically palatable way to consolidate the fragmented public-private land ownership patterns created by the railroad land grants. But in the process, public lands are being exchanged for land that had already been donated to the railroads--in effect, a second public land grant. Timber corporations, real estate brokers, and others are misusing the land exchange process in order to speculate for quick profits. Improper procedures, conflicts of interest, and bribery in connection with various land exchanges have led to four audits of the BLM and several ongoing investigations of the U. S. Forest Service. An investigative series on the abuses and problems with the land exchanges was published in the Seattle Times in 1998. The authors recommended several reforms, including (1) that exchange lands should be traded lands to the highest bidder, rather than to the corporation which suggests a deal (2) the land appraisals should be made public and (3) the public should be given a seat at the negotiating table. Many of the grassroots citizens groups which have arisen to monitor corporate-government land exchanges, including the Seattle-based Western Land Exchange Project, agree with these recommendations, and are working to expose land exchange abuses, and to ensure that reforms will take place. The land exchanges give a century-old court decision new relevancy: It seems but an ill return for the generosity of the Government in granting these railroads half its lands to claim that it thereby incidentally granted them the benefit of the whole. The names and faces of land grant reformers have changed, and the current issues may seem unique. But the goals and visions of the Farmers Alliances, the Populists, the conservationists, and all the others who have fought for democracy are alive. Their work to mitigate and reform the land grant policy continues, as it has for more than a century. What is missing from the scene today is an informed, aroused movement to revest the land grants themselves. An opinion poll during World War II showed that only half of the population had ever heard of the railroad land grants, and most of them thought the railroads had paid for the land. Since then, another half-century has passed, and the land grants have an even smaller place in our social memory. Without an awareness of the past, and an understanding of how it affects the present, we will continue to suffer the continuing impacts of the land grant legacy. Most of the recent attempts to correct or mitigate the problems unleashed by the railroad land grant policy are well-intentioned and necessary. They are also symptomatic treatments which do not address the underlying problem: a bad policy poorly implemented. As land reformer Sheldon Greene clearly stated, The economic interests of large landowners and railroads have prevented a broad-based distribution of public lands without proper regard for the public interest. Although 70 years now a century have passed since the bulk of our public lands were transferred to private ownership, the original distributive goal of the land laws remains unfulfilled. Yet, despite the lapse of time, it is still realistic to seek to attain this objective. As William Faulkner once wrote, history isnt dead its not even past. It is time to revisit the land grant era, an era which never ended. Its time to revest the land back to the public. The era of selling public lands to settlers is long over, but corporate control of land and resources has never been stronger than today. And the public lands have never been more in need of protection. Applegate, Rick. 1979. An Unintended Empire: A Case Study Of Rail Land Holdings . Pages 100-240 in: Additions to the National Wilderness Preservation System, hearings before the Subcommittee on Public Lands of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, House of Representatives, 96th Congress, 1st Session on H. R. 3928, held in Washington DC on Sept. 17, 1979. and oversights on land ownership in the Beaverhead and Gallatin National Forests, hearing held in Bozeman, Montana, Oct. 4, 1979. Serial No. 96-11, Part IV. 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